Invasion or Blockade? Part II: The Edges of the Board.

Westerners play chess.  Asians play Go.  That’s a crude summary of my previous post.*

If that is true, then we should watch not only the direct military measures China is taking vs. Taiwan, but the indirect measures it’s implementing as well.  Here then, is a non-exhaustive list of what is happening on the periphery of the board:

1.  Taiwan is gradually losing diplomatic partners.

In the ’70s, Taiwan had about 80 or 90 diplomatic partners; today that number is about 25.  China and Taiwan used to compete by "dollar diplomacy" – cash incentives in exchange for diplomatic recognition.  Today, an economically-rising China finds it easier to outbid Taiwan.

The effect is psychological.  With each loss of a diplomatic ally, Taiwan finds itself more and more alone in the world.  It creates a crisis of confidence when you claim to be a sovereign state, and virtually no one takes you seriously.

2.  In international forums, Taiwan is constantly humiliated.

Here I speak of the little humiliations – its flag taken down at conventions, its anthem not sung at Olympics, its political leaders not permitted to participate in conferences such as APEC.  It’s more than a little strange that a terrorist like Yassir Arafat could find a warm welcome in the White House, while the democratically-elected president of Taiwan has to enter America through the back door.  (In the case of Europe, even the back door is locked and bolted.)

Now admittedly, humiliation can make people angry, and it sometimes motivates people to work harder to overcome their obstacles.  But other times it leads to "whipped dog syndrome", where individuals (or countries?) give up and passively accept their abuse.

Call it a hunch, but I don’t think that a whipped dog makes an enthusiastic soldier.

3.  Outside pronouncements are harming Taiwanese morale.

Chinese delegates don’t press their foreign counterparts to repeat the "One China Principle" for their own sense of self-esteem.  It’s deliberately meant as a slap in the face of the Taiwanese.

The Taiwanese are pragmatic, and understand why foreign governments succumb to Chinese pressure.  That probably doesn’t make it hurt any less, though.

4.  Chinese pressure is being applied to influential figures.

Not so long ago, China said to investors, "Let politics be politics, and economics be economics."  In other words, the Chinese government tried to reassure potential investors that it understood the political and economic spheres were different, and that it would never, ever, ever hold their investments hostage for political purposes.

Those days have passed.

Within the last year, a Taiwanese tycoon, who had been a close friend of Taiwan’s independence parties, signed a document stating his "non-support" for Taiwanese independence.  The fact is that he had over 100,000 employees working for him in China, and the threats of an inspection here or a tax audit there must have been enough to change his way of thinking.

There’s a Chinese saying for this: "Kill a chicken to scare the monkeys."  Make an example of a prominent individual to receive the compliance of the majority.  It’s my prediction that more Taiwanese businessmen will be similarly coerced into signing such documents.  As time progresses, the statements will morph from "non-support for Taiwanese independence" to "full support for reunification".

After this, perhaps the communist authorities will demand that the businessmen make "donations" to pro-reunification parties in Taiwan.  As a sign of good faith.

(It should be noted that Chinese pressure is not only limited to economic figures.  A famous Taiwanese singer performed at the inauguration ceremonies of the pro-independence president in 2000.  Following a Chinese boycott of the singer, no artist was willing to make a repeat performance when that president was re-elected in 2004.  The incident was significant because I happen to think that for good or ill, artists’ opinions do influence people.)

5.  Taiwan’s central government faces pressure to dissolve itself.

This is something of an exaggeration.  It would be more accurate to say that the legislature is placing pressure on the executive to devolve its power to non-governmental agencies.  The negotiations involving direct Taiwan-China flights are a case in point.

It is my understanding that such negotiations are typically conducted on a government-to-government basis.  However, the Chinese government refuses to acknowledge the Taiwanese government, much less meet with them.  The Taiwanese legislature very helpfully suggested that the solution to the impasse would be to have private groups from each country carry out the negotiations.  The end result will be for China to get its way, while Taiwan’s central government sees its authority erode.

I’ve always thought that Marx’s "withering away of the state" was one of the most absurd piece of "reasoning" imaginable.  Yet today, in Taiwan, it is happening.

6.  Taiwanese constituencies are being seduced by Chinese blandishments.

Up until now, Taiwan’s southern farmers have been considered some of the independence movement’s most staunch supporters.  However, their support for the cause dimmed when China offered to buy Taiwanese produce at preferential prices.  Meanwhile, the Taiwanese tourism industry openly salivates over the prospects of Chinese being allowed into the country as tourists, heedless of the inherent security risks.  Both of these cases suggest that other sectors of the Taiwanese economy will be targetted likewise in the future.

Taiwan’s pro-unification parties make up the other prominent constituency that is being courted by Beijing.  I have stated before in previous posts that China’s modern communist party closely resembles Taiwan’s authoritarian party of the past, so it is not entirely surprising that the two should attempt a rapprochement.  The "communists" are willing to tolerate a free economy, just as the KMT of old was.  The "communists" are ruthless in suppressing any real or imaginary challenges to their political power, as was the KMT.

I do not pretend to know the motivation behind the KMT’s desire for reconciliation with the communists.  Is it the glory of making history?  Are there financial incentives?  Do they see Chinese nationalism as the only effective antidote to Taiwanese nationalism?  Do they hope to be granted the reins of power over a rump Chinese province stripped of its democracy?

I do not know.  What I do know is that I have a feeling of forboding when the youthful supporters of a political party wear black t-shirts deriding democracy, with such inspirational slogans as "Never trust democracy" and "Mobocracy".

* It should go without saying that this is not literally true, but is in fact a FABLE.  By the same token, men are not really from Mars and women are not really from Venus.

The value of a fable or an assumption lies not in its literal truth, but in the quality of its implications.  Physicists know very well that we don’t live in a frictionless world, but they quite happily make that assumption to simplify their calculations.  Economists are well aware that consumers are not always rational, but that assumption is required to calculate the expected price of gasoline during a shock in supply.

Similarly, I think we all know that some Westerners do in fact play Chinese checkers (I know I did), and Asians have been known to play chess.  But the blanket statement is a way of helping us see the forest for the trees.  If Asians have a preference for "indirect" games, then it is not unreasonable to expect that they would prefer indirect strategies in the real world as well.

Finally, whether a game or strategy is "direct" or "indirect" has nothing to do with its complexity or elegance.  An indirect game is simply defined as a game in which one’s pieces are either not removed from the board or are attacked by envelopment.  I would never dare to suggest that chess is not a complex or elegant game.

2 thoughts on “Invasion or Blockade? Part II: The Edges of the Board.”

  1. I’m not sure that Asians do have a preference for “indirect games”. In China, 象棋 is far more popular than 圍棋; and in Japan 将棋 is far more popular than 囲碁.
    Aside from that, though, it seems clear you have a low opinion of reunification with China. As you have pointed out, Taiwan’s sphere of influence is shrinking. If working with mainland China is out, then what do you recommend?

  2. Actually, for the “chess-Go” fable to be valid, Asians don’t need to have an ABSOLUTE preference for indirect games; they merely need a higher RELATIVE preference for them vis-a-vis their Western counterparts.
    As for your final question, I suppose that the biggest remedy for points 4,5 and 6 would be to slow down or stop Taiwanese investment in China. Put some teeth into the fines, start confiscating assets (legally, of course)…ANYTHING. Fostering economic dependence upon a nation that is trying to destroy you is suicide.
    The biggest remedy for points 2&3 would be for free nations to show a little more support for Taiwan. Even if it’s just moral support, like President Bush gave a few days ago. No decent Western leader should be bathing the Eiffel Tower in red lights when a communist dictator comes a-callin’.
    As for Taiwanese politicians who want to unify with an authoritarian state, the Taiwanese need to defeat them at the polls. If they can’t do that, then no one, but no one, can help them.
    (BTW, I think it’s a great pity that Taiwan no longer has a political party that advocates unification at some vague, nebulous, distant future time when China has a free press, multiparty democratic elections, and a population that isn’t afraid to pray without a license.)
    Finally, I’ll just be honest and say that I haven’t the foggiest idea how Taiwan can increase the number of diplomatic allies it has. If there was an easy way, it’d already have been done.

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