Month: November 2006

[The two posts that follow were initially part of a single reply I made to a reader who made this charge in response to one of last week’s posts.]

A few times in my comments section I’ve seen the sentiment expressed that making money is America’s sole motivation in selling weapons to Taiwan.  It’s kind of a Marxian argument, but never mind.  For in this post, I’ll attempt to disabuse the reader of the notion entirely.

Let me assure you, if America’s sole interest was simply to make money, it wouldn’t bother trying to sell Taiwan weapons at all.  Better instead to sell an equivalent dollar value of products from some American sunset industry, like textiles or tobacco.  That way, America would earn exactly the same thing, profit-wise, while the administration in charge would go on to reap a windfall of votes from older workers, grateful that their jobs had just been spared.*

The kicker to this is that an America that contented itself with only selling textiles or tobacco to Taiwan would need never fear economic retaliation from China.  Because as far as profits from weapons sales go, what the Taiwanese hand giveth, the Chinese hand threatens to taketh away.  Selling weapons to Taiwan is bad business.

Don’t believe me?  If an industry is profitable, what does elementary micro-economics predict?  Market entry.  At which point, I humbly point out that there aren’t a lot of countries clamoring to get a piece of the "profitable" Taiwanese arms market.  Quite the contrary, in fact.  The number of countries willing to sell military equipment to Taiwan has dwindled to a grand total of one.  Which is precisely the sort of response one would expect from suppliers involved in an unprofitable industry.

At some point in this argument, you might object that Taiwan is offered weapons because it just wouldn’t be interested in buying American textiles or tobacco.  Taiwan would find the COST of these things exceeded their VALUE (relative of course, to cheaper foreign alternatives), and would instantly reject them.  But apply that argument to defensive arms, and we suddenly notice a curious thing.

What we notice is that the executive branch of Taiwan’s government DOES believe the value of American arms outweighs its costs.  It behooves us then, to explore the reasons why.

[Part II of the reply can be found here.]

* This oversimplifies the situation somewhat, because it doesn’t take into account the wrath of defense industry workers who’ve lost out by the policy.  The key here is to remember that workers in sunset industries tend to be older (making them less easy to retrain) and more tied to their locale (owning homes in areas where it might be problematic to find a buyer).  Comparatively speaking then, workers in sunset industries are likely to feel a greater sense of relief and gratitude when their jobs are saved than those working in defense industries.

In the previous post, I pointed out the folly of believing that America just wants to sell Taiwan weapons in order to make money.  Believe it or not, there really ARE easier ways of making the stuff.

I generally take it as a given that sellers want to sell.  But sales never proceed unless the buyer also wants to buy.  Why then, did the KMT request the special arms package back in the late 90s?  What value did the KMT see in it then?  And more to the point, why does the executive branch of Taiwan’s government want to buy it now?

First, let’s state the blindingly obvious.  Weapons packages are valuable to Taiwan… because they contains WEAPONS.  Should war break out, having weapons on hand is usually considered a GOOD thing.  Against a full assault, Taiwan needs enough weapons to hold Chinese invaders off for a few weeks until an American fleet can arrive.  A Taiwan that’s unwilling to make that investment is a Taiwan that America might not be able to help, even with its best effort.

Besides full assaults, Taiwan also needs to concern itself about possible Chinese "ankle-biter" tactics.  Grant from the start that Patriot Missiles will never be able to protect Taiwan against a missile onslaught like that recently unleashed against Isreal by Hesb Allah.  The cost of such defense would be prohibitive.  But Patriots might come in VERY handy in defending against a one-a-day Hamas-style attack chiefly intended to demoralize Taiwan’s civilian population into accepting "reunification" talks on Beijing’s terms.

The second reason that weapons are valuable to Taiwan is that they provide military deterence.  They do this by raising the price of war to a level that Beijing might not be willing to pay.  For example, as things stand today, China might calculate that its fleet of submarines could cheaply and easily blockade Taiwan, bringing the island to its knees.  With Taiwan in possession of modern anti-sub airplanes, however, the equation changes.  That cheap and easy blockade suddenly isn’t so cheap and easy anymore, now that Chinese subs can be blown out of the water.  Sure, Taiwan’s anti-sub airplanes are pretty slow and can be shot down, but that means China has to deploy fighters in order to fight a RATHER expensive air war with Taiwan.  And so, it’s time for China to fish or cut bait.  China can either risk a whole lot more forces than it originally intended to…or it can end up leaving Taiwan alone.

The final reason that weapons have value for Taiwan is because they provide political deterence.  What I’m trying to say here is that there is a deterent effect to be gained not merely by the possession of weapons, BUT BY THE POLITICAL ACT OF BUYING AND DEPLOYING THEM.  Such an act in and of itself is a kind of signal which contains information about the level of determination a country or its leadership might have for resisting aggression.  But the converse is equally as true.  A country which DOESN’T attempt to defend itself in the face of aggression, and simultaneously expresses a willingness to barter away its sovereignty in exchange for a peace treaty, ALSO sends a message.  A message of quite a different sort – to both its enemies AND its friends.

Postscript:  Of the three weapons systems currently being considered, the only one I haven’t mentioned are the 8 diesel submarines.  Submarines are uniquely capable of surviving a Chinese first strike, and a few of these positioned near China’s shipping lanes could have an enormous impact on the amount of oil reaching Taiwan’s foe.  Secondly, Taiwanese subs offer the subs of its allies something very desirable, namely, plausible deniability.

For this, let us consider two scenarios: Scenario One, in which a Taiwan san subs is attacked by China, and Scenario Two, in which a Taiwan that possesses subs is attacked.

In both scenarios, China threatens war with any country that attempts to aid Taiwan.  What happens under each scenario when China finds its shipping under submarine attack?

Under Scenario One, China instantly knows that America or Japan is behind the sinkings, and  it retaliates, possibly before the American or Japanese fleet is ready for it.  But under Scenario Two, China can’t be sure that anyone other than Taiwan was behind the sinkings.  America and Japan can always deny their subs had anything to do it; they may even be telling the truth.  If China attacks America or Japan at this stage, they hand them a casus belli on a platter.

Before I close, I should point out that I’m not wedded to any of the particular weapons systems I’ve mentioned here, but I do think it’s worth trying to understand WHY Taiwan’s military is interested in acquiring them.  It’s also worth trying to understand why the KMT party should ever wish to block these weapons from reaching Taiwan.  But that’s a question best reserved for another day.