If China Attacks Taiwan: Chapter One

Drivers behind the use of force

Chapter One of If China Attacks Taiwan is written by the book’s editor, Steve Tsang.  In this introductory chapter, he integrates and summarizes the chapters which follow.  Here’s a few points he made that I thought were interesting:

1.  Like all dictatorships, the Chinese leadership suffers from a lack of negative feedback.  As Tsang says, "[China’s] assessments of outside reactions to China’s ‘righteous’ use of force against Taiwan are colored…[by the fact that its] diplomats are required not to contradict senior leaders even when reporting views they have collected and collated in their diplomatic missions."

So when the Chinese leadership likens itself to the North in the American Civil War, it’s not being informed that foreigners aren’t buying the analogy.  Pretty bad news if Hu Jintao* thinks the world will view him as Lincolnesque if he launches a war to "hold the Union together" and free the Taiwanese "slaves".

2.  Many in the Chinese military don’t seem to have a clue about the American psyche, which is why they entertain the notion that Americans would seek a quick negotiated settlement if one of their aircraft carriers is sunk.  Tsang correctly points out that the Japanese held similar thoughts prior to Pearl Harbor.

3.  While it was a British colony, Hong Kong was spared from sanctions whenever they were levied against China, but in the future it won’t be so lucky.  Which means that the two greatest engines of China’s growth, Taiwan and Hong Kong, would have their economies crippled in the event of war – at a time when China itself would fall under Western sanctions.  A triple whammy.

Now for a few gripes and quibbles.  A few sentences didn’t sit well with me:

"[The Taiwanese government] needs to take the China threat very seriously….[It should] send out signals, not only through policy statements but also by its deeds, that it will not cross Beijing’s albeit not clearly defined bottom line."

At this point, I’d like to point out that one of Beijing’s bottom lines is that it will use force against Taiwan if Taiwan is dilatory in coming to the table to discuss terms of its surrender.  It’s hard to see how Taiwan could satisfy this particular demand without actually surrendering.

Here’s another objectionable line:

"…it was necessary for George W. Bush…to rebuke publicly President Chen Shui-bian in December 2003, when Chen appeared to embark upon a course that could cause China to resort to force."

First of all, China is an independent moral actor, not a force of nature or a wild dog.  Taiwan cannot "cause" it to do anything at all; only China’s leaders can do that.  China’s leaders will be the ones responsible for any war of aggression against Taiwan, and the Chinese people themselves will be culpable to the degree that they acquiesce, or even approve.

Secondly and more importantly, Tsang is wrong:  the smackdown of Chen was a mistake, and its repercussions are still being felt to this very day.  The reason why Chen was dressed down was because he wanted to hold a referendum showing that the Taiwanese were united in their desire for China to remove its missiles and renounce the use of force against Taiwan.

Tough questions, those.

Should China remove its missiles pointed at Taiwan?  Yes or No?

Should China renounce the use of force against Taiwan?  Yes or No?

China got wind of this and claimed it was all nothing more than a rotten, low-down provocation.  Asking these questions of the Taiwanese people was "a course that could cause China to resort to force," China blustered.

You got that?  In the Merry Old Land of Beijing, merely asking China NOT to use force is justification for China TO use force.

Taiwan (cowering on the playground):  Please don’t hit me.

China:  Now you’re asking for it!  Saying that just makes me want to hit you even more!

China’s hyperventilating soon had the right effect.  The Bush administration got frightened by the tantrum, and denounced the referendum.  It was still held, although Chen watered down the questions a bit.  Peace prevailed, and more than a few members of the administration undoubtedly gave themselves a pat on the back for maintaining the status quo.

Ultimately though, the status quo was badly damaged.  The Taiwanese were rattled by the apparent loss of American support, and handed a legislative majority to the KMT and its allies.  KMT leaders then started to get awfully chummy with the Communist Party of China, and incredibly, even began to talk dreamily of a future Taiwanese "neutrality" vis-a-vis China & America.  What’s more, they proceeded to block the purchase of weapons Bush had authorized in 2001 and that they themselves had requested in the late ’90s.

In short, having won their majority with the Bush administration’s help, the KMT and its allies showed their gratitude by stabbing it in the back.  While it may be arguable that preventing a "provocative" referendum helped to maintain the peace, the balancing act unquestionably strengthened the position of capitulationist parties in Taiwan.  Taiwan was weakened, militarily and psychologically.

So a phony provocation was replaced by a real one.  Real, because as Ronald Reagan observed, weakness too, is provocative.


* My spell-checker highlighted "Jintao" and asked if I meant "junta" instead.  Just one of life’s funny coincidences.

Mini-Book Review: If China Attacks Taiwan

Over the last month, I couldn’t keep proper track of the news in Taiwan while visiting the folks back home, so I promised myself I’d try to refrain from commenting about current events here until I got back up to speed.

Therefore, instead of discussing the libel ruling against Taiwan’s major independence party, or the renaming of the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport), I thought I’d spend the next few days talking about If China Attacks Taiwan: Miltary Strategy, Politics and Economics.  I’ll give a mini-review in this post, and then go through it chapter by chapter over the next few days, mentioning a few facts and bits of trivia that I found interesting or surprising.

(A more in-depth review can be found on Dr. Keating’s website here.)

The first thing I noticed about this book in the store was its length (200 pages).  Good.  I like short books because I can find time to finish them – there are enough 800 page behemoths waiting for me on my shelf, thank you very much.

The disadvantage of such brevity though, is that some rather important topics aren’t covered at all.  If China Attacks Taiwan does an excellent job in telling the reader what China could throw at Taiwan, and a pretty good job in informing us what Taiwan could do in response.  However, it has very little to say about what America could bring to the field, and nothing about a possible Japanese response.

(I confess to be very interested in the latter, and so was a bit disappointed.  Of course, add America & Japan to the mix and the book could have easily doubled in length.)

If China Attacks Taiwan is well organized, each chapter being written by a specialist with his own particular area of expertise.  Accordingly, one finds entire chapters devoted to short-range ballistic missiles, unconventional warfare, air war, sea war, and logistics.  So while it doesn’t cover everything, what it does cover, it covers well.

Just a couple things in closing.  This an expensive book – $115 over at Amazon.com.  That’s $115 for 200 pages.  Guess I should consider myself lucky that it was "only" $1500 NT ($45) at the Warner Village Eslite.

I’ll also say that it’s my impression that a few of the authors took great pains explaining why the Communist leadership feels it’s important to conquer Taiwan, without stating why it might be equally important for the Taiwanese, Americans and Japanese to stand in opposition.  Maybe that’s a false impression, but it’s the one I received when I read it a month ago.

Johnny Rejects Isolationism

From Johnny Neihu’s Saturday column in the Taipei Times:

Anyway, after a long day of clack-clacking [mahjong tiles] and shots of icy beer…I read an article that had been printed off the Internet by one of my more English-savvy friends from the mahjong marathon. It was a June 3 piece called "The Perils of Threat Inflation" by one William Lind*,and brought me back to such a level of agitation that I wished I hadn’t read it. I’ll be honest: I was so scandalized that the three or four schoolgirls opposite me in the [subway] carriage turned off their iPods to watch and hear an old man self-combust.

What got Johnny into such a state was Lind’s suggestion that China’s claims on Taiwan were legitimate, and that the U.S. should butt out.

Instead of repeating Johnny’s points for him, I’ll just quote from Mr. Lind’s column, and raise a few objections of my own:

Under its "one China" policy, the U.S. recognizes that Taiwan is part of China.

Sorry Mr. Lind, but that’s not quite true.  The U.S. acknowledges China’s position that it has a claim to Taiwan, but it’s wrong to say that it recognizes it.

In the same manner, I can acknowledge that the crazy-ass president of Iran thinks he has a right to develop nuclear weapons and wipe Israel off the map.

But I certainly don’t recognize him as having any such right whatsoever.

Lind then tries to explain why poor little China will be forced against its will to put the Taiwanese in their place:

Taiwan is vastly important to China, because the great threat to China throughout its history has been internal division. If one province, Taiwan, can secure its independence, why cannot other provinces do the same? It is the spectre of internal break-up that forces China to prevent Taiwanese independence at any cost, including war with America.

Reality check here:  Taiwan has NEVER been controlled by the People’s Republic of China.  Moreover, within the last century, Taiwan was only a part of a "Greater China" for a couple of years following World War II.  That means that it’s essentially been separate from Greater China for a hundred years now.  And in spite of this, Communist China has miraculously managed to maintain its internal cohesiveness during its entire 50 year lifespan without collecting a single NT dollar in taxes, without imprisoning a single Taiwanese democracy advocate, and without murdering a single Falun Gong adherent.

Maybe, just maybe, it’s an exaggeration then to say that Taiwanese independence is the single magical element that can bring the whole Chinese house of cards crashing down.

Next, Lind looks to history for an excuse not to get involved:

A strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China points to an obvious parallel, the strategic rivalry between England and Germany before World War I.

[…]

America needs to handle a rising China the way Britain handled a rising America, not a rising Germany.

I think the World War I analogy useful, but draw rather different conclusions from it than Mr. Lind does. To begin with, it’s an error to think that World War I occurred because of some kind of "strategic rivalry".  The Great War started because of German militarism, pure and simple.  Donald Kagan’s book, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, outlines Britain’s dilemma:

The question is, what "accommodation" could the European states have made to the German "upstart" that would have brought satisfaction to Germany and stability to Europe?  What, in fact, did Germany want?  At the turn of the century, Germany was the strongest military power in the world.  It also had the strongest and most dynamic economy on the Continent.  In 1897, without any previous naval tradition, without any new challenge from the sea to require an expensive change in policy, the Germans undertook the construction of a major battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea where it threatened British naval superiority and the only security available to Britain.  The British gradually became alarmed as they came to recognize the threat Germany posed.

…their fears were well-founded.  However often the Kaiser might proclaim his friendly feelings for England and Tirpitz declare that the fleet had no offensive purposes, the continued construction of big battleships concentrated in the North Sea and the acceleration of that construction justified British suspicion and fear, even without inside information about German intentions.  Scholarship, of course, has now made clear that Britain really was the target of the new German Navy and that the likeliest explanation of Tirpitz’s otherwise irrational naval program is that it aimed at least at equality with the British fleet; when combined with Germany’s military power it would give the Germans the ability to change the status quo in its favor and to the great and dangerous disadvantage of other powers…It would be some years before the Germans could hope for parity at sea, but the British expected that even before the Germans were prepared for a confrontation at sea, they would try to use their "risk" fleet to force concessions.

(Kagan, p 206-207)

Some clue as to what these concessions might have looked like in the long run can be drawn from German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg’s "September Program" for Europe, which was drawn up a month after hostilities began:

The [German] military would decide whether the French should cede Belfort, the western slopes of the Vosges, the coast from Dunkirk to Boulogne, and destroy their forts on the German frontier…Germany would acquire the iron mines of Briey.  A preferential trade treaty would make France "our export land," and the French would be required to pay an indemnity that would make it impossible for them to manufacture armaments for at least twenty years.  Belgium would lose Liege, Verviers, and probably Antwerp, and would become a vassal state, accepting German garrisons in its ports…Holland would be ostensibly independent, "but essentially subject to us."  Luxembourg would be directly incorporated into the German empire.  Apart from these territorial provisions, but by no means less important, was the plan for establishing "an economic organization of Mitteleuropa through mutual customs agreements…including France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden, and Norway" that would guarantee German economic domination of Europe.

(Kagan, p 208)

Looking at this laundry list, it may be difficult for the modern reader to imagine that most Germans considered Bethmann Hollweg’s demands to be too…moderate.  Germans – left, right, and center – wanted more.  Of this, Kagan writes:

A "Petition of Intellectuals" published in July 1915 was signed by a great number of theologians, teachers, artists, writers, and some 352 university professors; it demanded a program of annexations that went far beyond the September Program.  At the same time…the leader of the Catholic Center party, Matthias Erzberger, was demanding the annexation of Belgium, parts of France, and the entire Congo, the conversion of the Baltic states and Ukraine into German dependencies, and the imposition of a reparation bill that would more than pay off the entire German national debt.

(Kagan, p 209)

In short, if one truly believes that China is some kind of Wilhelmine Germany analog, then one ought to be prepared to receive from China a set of territorial demands and economic concessions far in excess of little old Taiwan.  Exactly then, how many OTHER countries are we prepared to sell down the river?

Finally, Lind raises the specter of a nuclear confrontation, which ultimately gets back to the familiar question about whether America is willing to sacrifice Los Angeles for Taipei.  A Chinese general asked that a few years back, and Taiwanese (or are they Chinese?) commenters on Taiwan-related blogs ask it as well.

I confess I get a bit confused when I hear the question.  You see, China claims that the world has absolutely nothing to fear from it; that it’s peacefully rising.  It swears this, up and down, to any and all.

I wonder then, will all that peaceful rising occur before or AFTER they nuke L.A.?**

Putting that aside, Mr. Lind should try to remember that the Cold War wasn’t won by wetting our pants over the possibility of exchanging D.C. for Paris.  It was won by facing the communists down, and by betting that they were rational actors who weren’t prepared to to lose THEIR cities in an unjustified war of aggression.

Is America willing to sacrifice Los Angeles for Taipei?  My response is to turn that question, which is asked purely in an effort to demoralize, upon its head.  What we really should ask is whether it is the Chinese who are willing to sacrifice Beijing for Banchiao***, or Shanghai for ShiminDing****?

If China is tempted to answer that irrationally enough, it may one day find itself boasting of its five thousand year history…while looking forward to nothing more than a fifteen minute future.


* Lind’s column is over at lewrockwell.com.  Looking over the site, I can’t help but wonder what Ludwig von Mises would have said if someone had told him that 33 years after his death, the president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute would be writing a column extolling the virtues of anarchy in Somalia.

What the president of the Institute seems to have forgotten is that von Mises was no anarchist – he was a classical liberal.  Classical liberals advocate the "night-watchman state" – one which limits itself to protecting life, liberty and property.

That doesn’t make them friends of modern big government, but it hardly makes them "anti-state", either.

** The paradox suggests that the Chinese are lying.  But about what?  About their peaceful rising?  Their willingness to start lobbing nukes around in order to conquer Taiwan?

Or maybe all the above?

*** A city on the outskirts of Taipei.

**** A Taipei shopping district.


UPDATE (Jun 27/06):  Are the Chinese willing to sacrifice Beijing for Banchiao?  Some speculation here that the Taiwanese might have a few nukes of their own.  Not sure how seriously this should be taken.

Fingerprinting

Part of me HATES stuff like this:

The [Taiwanese] Ministry of Justice said yesterday the requirement for visitors from China to have their fingerprints taken upon arrival should be implemented as soon as possible.

[…]

At present, certain categories of Chinese citizens, including professionals and technicians, can visit Taiwan. The newly revised statute on cross-strait exchanges requires fingerprinting for them, but the requirement has not been implemented because some complementary measures have yet to be fleshed out.

As the government is preparing to open the door for ordinary Chinese citizens to sightsee in Taiwan, the officials said they will push for a further law revision to require fingerprinting for Chinese tourists as well as Chinese fishery workers aboard Taiwanese fishing boats and seized illegal Chinese immigrants.

Unfortunately however, I don’t see how Taiwan can afford to be laissez faire about a million prospective tourists from a hostile foreign country flooding onto its shores.  Taiwan and China don’t share criminal dossiers, and the two countries have no extradition treaty.  What a terrific opportunity for China’s criminal element!

But let’s leave concerns about crime aside.  How would America have reacted if the Soviets had allowed 10 million of their citizens to visit PER YEAR?  Sure, on the one hand, a lot of those tourists would have gone home knowing that America wasn’t the demon that the communist propaganda mill was making it out to be.  But on the other hand, the possiblilities for breaches in national security might well have been intolerable.  Here in our time, it’s safe to say that there are plenty of young men from Muslim countries that would absolutely LOVE to visit America.  However, for some reason or another, they haven’t exactly been welcomed with open arms lately.  Ever wonder why THAT is?

So yeah, the libertarian in me has pretty strong reservations about fingerprinting tourists, whatever their national origin.  But the conservative in me, well, he can’t find it in himself to work up much outrage.  Because THAT guy’s of the opinion that if somebody wants to be treated like a friend, then they’d better damn well be willing to act like one.


UPDATE (Apr 28/06):  A KMT legislator suggested that other nationalities also be fingerprinted – in the interest of "impartiality".

Why stop there, Mr. Wizard?  Maybe Taiwan’s armed forces should begin training for a possible Lithuanian invasion.  In the interest of impartiality, of course.

War Drill

Page 3 of Tuesday’s Taipei Times had a story informing us that a surprise war drill in Taiwan will be held later this month.  The purpose of the drill is not to see how fast the jets can be scrambled or the defense systems can be brought on-line; the goal is to evacuate Taiwan’s political leadership from downtown Taipei, and rehearse the strategic / political response to a Chinese attack:

According to a report in the Chinese-language newspaper the China Times, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and high-level Cabinet members will suddenly be informed later this month without warning that Chinese missiles will reach Taipei within minutes. They will be required to meet at an emergency room at the Hengshan [Mountain] (衡山) strategic command in Taipei’s northern suburb of Dazhi (大直) within 10 minutes.

I can’t find Dazhi on my map of Taipei, so I’m going to guess that it’s somewhere near the Yangmingshan area.  The President is supposed to be spirited there by chopper, but the defense minister will have to get there by car.

In ten minutes.  From the middle of downtown Taipei.

He doesn’t need a car.  What he needs is transporter technology or a pair of ruby slippers.  The roads in Northern Taiwan are pretty congested, and they’d be even more difficult to navigate after the inevitable sabotage.Maybe traffic control could give him green lights all the way, but you’d have to expect electronic warfare on that front as well.

I just hope that one of his deputies is posted in Hengshan at all times.  Because the minister of defense just might be awhile.

The story goes on to say what will happen in Hengshan:

"Chen will immediately conduct a 90-minute national security meeting, followed by a 60-minute military meeting. The president will then decide whether the country would declare war against China after the meetings," the report said.

The report said that the war games will simulate two scenarios: Taiwan coming under a large-scale missile attack from China and China launching a decapitation-style attack on Taipei.

The report said various political, military, diplomatic and economic issues would be dealt with in the war-games, including outlining how to ask for foreign help, ways to communicate with the nation’s most important allies, the US and Japan, as well as methods to reassure the public and stabilize consumer prices, and rescue the injured.

What can I say about any of this?  I’m just glad that I don’t have Chen’s job.


* Sabotage will of course, be facilitated when large numbers of Chinese are permitted into the country as "tourists".  Perhaps as a sign of hospitality, each should be given a rifle and grenade at customs, so as to save them the long commute to their pre-positioned weapons drop points.

Seditious Acts

Saturday’s Taiwan News reported on a ceremony marking the 17th anniversary of the death of Deng Nan-jung, a Taiwanese democracy advocate.  Deng was apparently the editor of a weekly magazine, "Era of Liberty", when it published a hypothetical constitution for a Taiwanese republic.  For this, the KMT shut the magazine down, and issued a subpoena for him to answer charges of sedition.  Rather than comply, Deng committed suicide by lighting a few barrels of gasoline in his office.

Sedition charges.  For PROPOSING a new constitution.  And only 17 years ago.  It’s easy for the world (and me!) to forget how recently stuff like that was happening here.

Speaking of sedition, the March 22nd edition of the Taipei Times had a letter to the editor with a couple of intriguing paragraphs in it:

…in his interview with [Taiwanese TV network] TVBS on Feb. 28, [KMT leader] Ma said that he suggested the EU consider lifting the arms embargo on China during his recent visits to London and Brussels.  (Emphasis added)

[…]

We…demand that Ma explain why he initiated the discussion of lifting the arms embargo on China in Europe, while in Taiwan his party has repeatedly blocked weapons purchases from the US.

First of all, can anyone confirm that this is true?  I have no interest in spreading falsehoods about Ma Ying-jeou, and if I find out this is BS, then I’ll HAPPILY correct it in a new post.  Because the man either said on national television that he lobbied the EU to arm Taiwan’s enemy, or he didn’t.

If it IS true, then decide for yourself which of the two cases outlined here truly represents an act of sedition.


UPDATE (Apr 10/06):  Thanks to Tim Maddog for finding the link to the letter to the Taipei Times.  It’s now included in the post.

He was also able to find a transcript of the TVBS interview, and included an excerpt in his comments.  His English translation can be found here.

UPDATE #2 (Apr 10/06):  It seems as though Ma didn’t "lobby" the EU to remove the arms embargo on China, but he did provide them with conditions for the embargo’s removal (ie: improved human rights conditions in China and "peaceful development" of cross-strait relations).

The tone of the speaker is EVERYTHING in this case.  When asked about whether the embargo should be lifted, did Ma say, "No"…or "HELL NO"?

That makes a big difference.

(I’d be willing to guess that Ma’s response to the question was exceptionally mild.  To date, his  harshest criticism of China’s Anti-Secession Law has been to say that it was "unnecessary" and "unwise".  Really, does he kiss his mother with that mouth?)

Secondly, I would like to know whether Ma helpfully offered the Europeans those conditions on his own initiative, or whether he gave those answers while being pressed.  If it was the former, then he probably earned a few brownie points in Beijing for giving them an out.  If the latter, then perhaps his answer was foolish, but not malicious.

The reason why I say it was foolish is that proposed conditions for removing the embargo ought to be specific and difficult to meet.  Ma’s criteria however, are vague, and therefore too easily obtainable.  Think about the human rights condition:  If China frees a couple of Falun Gong members, won’t European merchants of death be tempted to point to that as evidence that human rights are improving?  As for "peaceful development of cross-strait relations", would Taipei accepting a couple of pandas qualify?  Ma set the bar far too low, and didn’t even suggest that China should become more democratic.  His little performance may not have been seditious, but it wasn’t exactly a vigorous defense of Taiwan’s interests, either.

Soft Coups And The Pan-Blue Line Of Silence

The 2004 presidential election in Taiwan was a precarious time.  Just imagine it:  President Chen gets shot a day before the election by an unknown assassin.  Then we hear he’s still alive; the bullet merely grazed him.  Lien Chan, his KMT opponent, demands to visit the injured president in hospital, but is rebuffed – probably because the president believes Lien was behind the shooting.  Lien then trivializes the crime by telling television reporters that the situation is "not a crisis".  The military is mobilized.

The next day, the wounded president wins by a miniscule 30,000 votes.

And things REALLY get hairy after that.

First, the KMT and its allies go ballistic.  Didn’t their polls tell them their guy was 4-7% ahead?  Didn’t their newspapers tell them their guy was a shoo-in?  Their guy COULDN’T have lost, so they take to the streets.  They demand a recount.  They demand a do-over.  What of the members of the military who didn’t get to vote because of the mobilization in the wake of the assassination attempt?  Let them vote, and let them vote NOW.  Thirty thousand votes – that’s all the KMT needs.  Just 30,000…

What, the law says we CAN’T do any of those things, at least not immediately?  Well then, bend the law – JUST THIS ONCE.  President Chen, the KMT DEMANDS that you declare a State of Emergency so that the niceties of the law can be set aside*.

In the southern port city of Gowshung, KMT mobs gather and try to storm a government building, but are held back by police standing behind mobile metal barricades.  A KMT legislator with a bullhorn gets on top of a van and orders it to charge the barricades.  The van doesn’t break through, but one policeman is injured – possibly with a broken arm.  Incredibly, the China Post claims that the "crowd" was merely "trying to learn the TRUTH about the assassination".

I wonder how much truth they got out of nearly running over that policeman.

In the northern city of Taipei, thousands of angry KMT supporters march in the cold rain.  I don’t recall there being cases of egregious violence like in Gowshung, but matters take an ominous turn when men in military uniforms are permitted to address the marchers.  Rumors swirl of an impending coup.  Taiwan’s defense minister resigns.  KMT leader Lien Chan grants the crowd his permission to "eliminate" the president.  Meanwhile, Communist China announces it will not sit by idly if the island descends into chaos…

After a few very tense days, America extends its congratulations to Chen, thereby recognizing the legitimacy of the election.  The ranks of the demonstrators slowly thin, though the street protests continue for a month or so.  The KMT explores legal avenues towards declaring the election null and void, but these end up leading nowhere.  It concocts elaborate conspiracy theories suggesting that the Machiavellian Chen was behind his own shooting in order to win "sympathy votes", and to deny 200,000 members of the military their franchise**.  These theories it attempts to "prove" by conducting an unconstitutional investigation that few of the principals cooperate with.  The investigation is eventually terminated by the Supreme Court.

Flash forward to this week.  Evidence that the rumors about a coup two years ago were not without foundation:

During a legislative hearing, Minister of National Defense Lee Jye (李傑) yesterday said that some military personnel had approached him and asked him to feign sickness and step aside so that they could organize a coup against President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).  (Emphasis added)

[…]

Lee Jye, who was Chief of General Staff at the time, yesterday confirmed these reports.

"Some unidentified military personnel came to me and asked me to `play sick’ so they could carry out their plans to oust the president. But, when I refused immediately, they just walked away," Lee said.

Fortunately for Taiwan, the mutinous officers were not more ruthless.  This time, anyways.  Fortunate too, that Lee was an honorable man.  But as the German saying goes, "Unlucky is the land that needs heroes." 

In March of 2004, Taiwan was a land in need of them:

DPP Legislator Lee Wen-chung (李文忠) had said at a press conference that three admirals and eight lieutenant generals had been asked to resign or pretend they were ill after the presidential election. However, no military officials followed [the defense minister’s resignation], which Lee Wen-chung attributed to the successful [depoliticization] of the military.  (Emphasis added)

News reports had reported that three deputy chiefs of the general staff at the time — military adviser to the president Admiral Fei Hung-po (費鴻波), MND deputy-minister Admiral Chu Kai-sheng (朱凱生) and Chief of the Air force General Liu Kuei-li (劉貴立) were the key targets that had been asked to resign.

Then Deputy Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-mi (陳肇敏) was also reported to have been encouraged to resign.

At the moment, the question of whether the coup plotters acted on their own or were asked by KMT political leaders is a salient one.  Chen’s political opponents have sued him for libel for saying they were involved in the "soft coup"***.  The case is being retried for technical reasons, but the evidence for KMT involvement may not be firm:

[Lee Jye said the plotters,] "came to me on behalf of [a] `certain group of people.’"

However, Lee said that neither former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) nor People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) had approached him or sent anyone to see him on their behalf. But he said he was quite sure that the military personnel who came to him were [KMT] supporters [or their allies].

Who were the plotters?  Their identities are unknown to the public, but have been revealed in closed door sessions of the libel trial.  It’s unfathomable to me why their names and faces aren’t plastered on the front page of every newspaper in the country.  Firing them, allowing them to retire, or "promoting" them to an important post in the 21st Envelope-Stuffing Battalion isn’t enough:  Each and every one of them should be tried for sedition and punished as an example to army officers in the future.  Leniency of course should be granted to those who finger political instigators.  Not wanting to air the military’s dirty laundry is no excuse for covering this up. I cannot help but agree with one legislator (a KMT lawmaker, no less!) who spoke about the matter to Lee Jye during a hearing:

"Because you refused to name the generals who approached you and asked you to feign sickness and step aside, everyone keeps guessing, and that has hurt the reputations of innocent generals."


* It was quite a spectacle to witness the KMT asking the same man they vilified as an "evil dictator" to declare martial law.  How many of you would ask a political opponent to declare martial law if you truly believed he had tyrannical tendencies?

** The KMT has stated that its party lost a disproportionate number of votes when the military was mobilized, because the military is composed primarily of KMT supporters.  While this may be true with respect to the officer class, it is a dubious claim to make regarding the young draftees that make up the bulk of Taiwan’s armed forces.

*** The coup was intended to be a "soft" one – the mutinous armed forces did not intend to actually depose Chen, but they DID plan to cease obeying his orders.  Without control over the military, Chen’s legitimacy would have been undermined, and he would have been forced to resign, sooner or later.

China’s Strategic Oil Reserves

A few lines from "China to begin filling strategic oil reserves" in the March 7th edition of The China Post.  (Sorry, no link available).

China will start filling the first of its strategic oil reserve facilities by the year end, a senior planning official said Monday….Three other strategic oil reserve facilities will be ready in 2007-2008, [said the chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission]…

China…had previously not stocked its reserves due to high oil prices.

[…]

China hopes its reserves will be able to hold up to half a year’s supply of oil within 10 years. [emphasis added]

China currently has a 30 day reserve; if it achieves these announced goals, it will have a similar amount of oil in reserve as America and Japan.  Thus, in the event of war, China would be able to weather disruptions in supply due to submarine warfare for a similar duration as its most likely adversaries.

I wonder then, if China’s fuss over the National Unification Council has been nothing more than a classical case of misdirection.  China’s been going on and on about Taiwan’s provocations for the last week (regarding the elimination of a $30 a year council that hadn’t met in 7 years), and in response, the papers have given the subject prominent attention.  Meanwhile, China has embarked on a status quo-shattering policy, which only one of Taiwan’s three English newspapers saw fit mention (and barely at that).

Houdini would be proud.

Indian Su-30s vs. American F-16s

For the last two years, India has beaten the USAF in wargames using Russian Su-30s.  This is of some concern to Taiwan, since its F-16s might someday have to face Chinese-owned Su-30s.

It turns out that the rules of the US-Indian wargames may have been a bit slanted in India’s favor:

These days, American pilots use close in dog fighting (with heat seeking Sidewinder missiles) as a fall back tactic. The main air-to-air weapon of the U.S. Air Force is now the long range (over 50 kilometers) AMRAAM missile, and superior radar equipmentwhen American fighter pilots go train with foreign air forces, they have to take their BVR (Beyond Visual Range) tactics off the table, since under those conditions, the “enemy” force would not have much of a chance.

India vs. Americans

(Taiwan received the first of its AMRAAM missiles back in 2004.)

Winds of Change had a similar, though longer, take on these wargames.  Many of the commenters went into more technical detail than I am qualified to discuss, but one had a political observation that I quite liked:

(The results are that) the Indian gov’t gets to go to its people and say "We beat the U.S.!", and the DoD gets to go to Congress and say "We lost to India!"

EU Warned Not to Sell Weapons to China

Chinese President Hu Jintao is in Europe, and is trying to get the Europeans to drop the arms embargo they imposed after the Tianamen Square Massacre.

In response, an American representative once again warned Europe of sanctions if the embargo is lifted.

My guess is that Hu is going to be disappointed.  The French have been the chief instigators in trying to lift the embargo, as part of their "multi-polar world" (read: anti-American) policy.  But in the wake of the Paris-tinian insurrection, I believe their confidence will be sufficiently shaken to preclude any unfriendly actions towards America.

For now.

US warns EU again over arms embargo

Update: David’s Medienkritik has a report about Hu’s visit to Germany.