Category: Relations – Taiwanese-American

[The two posts that follow were initially part of a single reply I made to a reader who made this charge in response to one of last week’s posts.]

A few times in my comments section I’ve seen the sentiment expressed that making money is America’s sole motivation in selling weapons to Taiwan.  It’s kind of a Marxian argument, but never mind.  For in this post, I’ll attempt to disabuse the reader of the notion entirely.

Let me assure you, if America’s sole interest was simply to make money, it wouldn’t bother trying to sell Taiwan weapons at all.  Better instead to sell an equivalent dollar value of products from some American sunset industry, like textiles or tobacco.  That way, America would earn exactly the same thing, profit-wise, while the administration in charge would go on to reap a windfall of votes from older workers, grateful that their jobs had just been spared.*

The kicker to this is that an America that contented itself with only selling textiles or tobacco to Taiwan would need never fear economic retaliation from China.  Because as far as profits from weapons sales go, what the Taiwanese hand giveth, the Chinese hand threatens to taketh away.  Selling weapons to Taiwan is bad business.

Don’t believe me?  If an industry is profitable, what does elementary micro-economics predict?  Market entry.  At which point, I humbly point out that there aren’t a lot of countries clamoring to get a piece of the "profitable" Taiwanese arms market.  Quite the contrary, in fact.  The number of countries willing to sell military equipment to Taiwan has dwindled to a grand total of one.  Which is precisely the sort of response one would expect from suppliers involved in an unprofitable industry.

At some point in this argument, you might object that Taiwan is offered weapons because it just wouldn’t be interested in buying American textiles or tobacco.  Taiwan would find the COST of these things exceeded their VALUE (relative of course, to cheaper foreign alternatives), and would instantly reject them.  But apply that argument to defensive arms, and we suddenly notice a curious thing.

What we notice is that the executive branch of Taiwan’s government DOES believe the value of American arms outweighs its costs.  It behooves us then, to explore the reasons why.

[Part II of the reply can be found here.]

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* This oversimplifies the situation somewhat, because it doesn’t take into account the wrath of defense industry workers who’ve lost out by the policy.  The key here is to remember that workers in sunset industries tend to be older (making them less easy to retrain) and more tied to their locale (owning homes in areas where it might be problematic to find a buyer).  Comparatively speaking then, workers in sunset industries are likely to feel a greater sense of relief and gratitude when their jobs are saved than those working in defense industries.

In the previous post, I pointed out the folly of believing that America just wants to sell Taiwan weapons in order to make money.  Believe it or not, there really ARE easier ways of making the stuff.

I generally take it as a given that sellers want to sell.  But sales never proceed unless the buyer also wants to buy.  Why then, did the KMT request the special arms package back in the late 90s?  What value did the KMT see in it then?  And more to the point, why does the executive branch of Taiwan’s government want to buy it now?

First, let’s state the blindingly obvious.  Weapons packages are valuable to Taiwan… because they contains WEAPONS.  Should war break out, having weapons on hand is usually considered a GOOD thing.  Against a full assault, Taiwan needs enough weapons to hold Chinese invaders off for a few weeks until an American fleet can arrive.  A Taiwan that’s unwilling to make that investment is a Taiwan that America might not be able to help, even with its best effort.

Besides full assaults, Taiwan also needs to concern itself about possible Chinese "ankle-biter" tactics.  Grant from the start that Patriot Missiles will never be able to protect Taiwan against a missile onslaught like that recently unleashed against Isreal by Hesb Allah.  The cost of such defense would be prohibitive.  But Patriots might come in VERY handy in defending against a one-a-day Hamas-style attack chiefly intended to demoralize Taiwan’s civilian population into accepting "reunification" talks on Beijing’s terms.

The second reason that weapons are valuable to Taiwan is that they provide military deterence.  They do this by raising the price of war to a level that Beijing might not be willing to pay.  For example, as things stand today, China might calculate that its fleet of submarines could cheaply and easily blockade Taiwan, bringing the island to its knees.  With Taiwan in possession of modern anti-sub airplanes, however, the equation changes.  That cheap and easy blockade suddenly isn’t so cheap and easy anymore, now that Chinese subs can be blown out of the water.  Sure, Taiwan’s anti-sub airplanes are pretty slow and can be shot down, but that means China has to deploy fighters in order to fight a RATHER expensive air war with Taiwan.  And so, it’s time for China to fish or cut bait.  China can either risk a whole lot more forces than it originally intended to…or it can end up leaving Taiwan alone.

The final reason that weapons have value for Taiwan is because they provide political deterence.  What I’m trying to say here is that there is a deterent effect to be gained not merely by the possession of weapons, BUT BY THE POLITICAL ACT OF BUYING AND DEPLOYING THEM.  Such an act in and of itself is a kind of signal which contains information about the level of determination a country or its leadership might have for resisting aggression.  But the converse is equally as true.  A country which DOESN’T attempt to defend itself in the face of aggression, and simultaneously expresses a willingness to barter away its sovereignty in exchange for a peace treaty, ALSO sends a message.  A message of quite a different sort – to both its enemies AND its friends.

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Postscript:  Of the three weapons systems currently being considered, the only one I haven’t mentioned are the 8 diesel submarines.  Submarines are uniquely capable of surviving a Chinese first strike, and a few of these positioned near China’s shipping lanes could have an enormous impact on the amount of oil reaching Taiwan’s foe.  Secondly, Taiwanese subs offer the subs of its allies something very desirable, namely, plausible deniability.

For this, let us consider two scenarios: Scenario One, in which a Taiwan san subs is attacked by China, and Scenario Two, in which a Taiwan that possesses subs is attacked.

In both scenarios, China threatens war with any country that attempts to aid Taiwan.  What happens under each scenario when China finds its shipping under submarine attack?

Under Scenario One, China instantly knows that America or Japan is behind the sinkings, and  it retaliates, possibly before the American or Japanese fleet is ready for it.  But under Scenario Two, China can’t be sure that anyone other than Taiwan was behind the sinkings.  America and Japan can always deny their subs had anything to do it; they may even be telling the truth.  If China attacks America or Japan at this stage, they hand them a casus belli on a platter.

Before I close, I should point out that I’m not wedded to any of the particular weapons systems I’ve mentioned here, but I do think it’s worth trying to understand WHY Taiwan’s military is interested in acquiring them.  It’s also worth trying to understand why the KMT party should ever wish to block these weapons from reaching Taiwan.  But that’s a question best reserved for another day.

You’re takin’ this very personal.  Tom, this is business, and this man is takin’ it very, very personal.
– Sonny Corleone

For the last three weeks, the KMT and its allies have been trying to make an issue out of American diplomat Stephen Young’s utterances in an effort to divert attention away from their blocking of the special arms budget.  When Young said it was impolite for People First Party chairman James Soong to heckle Taiwan’s president during National Day, the PFP and some members of the KMT began making noises about deportation.  Their calls to have Young declared persona non grata intensified when he delivered a speech in which he stressed the urgency for Taiwan to pass a "robust arms package" by the end of the fall legislative session.  Young’s statements, they objected, amounted to interference in Taiwan’s internal political affairs.

(The China Post printed four hysteric anti-Young / anti-American letters between October 28th and the 30th.  They can be reviewed here.)

The sniping at Young hasn’t been limited to threats of expulsion, however.  Just forget that the KMT blocked the special arms bill 68 times over the last two years – that’s irrelevant.  Because suddenly, it’s all YOUNG’S fault that the KMT’s blocking weapons for Taiwan:

Kuomintang lawmakers [claimed] the warnings Stephen Young…issued would "adversely affect" the progress of the necessary deliberation.

"Now that the ultimatum has been given, we cannot afford to adopt the bill at once," said Tseng Yung-chuan, the Kuomintang legislative caucus whip. If it does, he added, the Kuomintang will be called "a chicken."

What a terrific way to rationalize delay and to try to smear Young in front of his superiors, all at the same time.  We’d really like to move on this, America – really we would – but that guy you sent over sure is making it tough for us to get the job done.  Maybe you’re not aware of this, but here in Taiwan, it’s considered an INTOLERABLE loss of face to take the garbage out after your wife asks you to.

(Especially if she’s already asked you 68 times in a row.)

Monday’s papers also reported the KMT employing a bit of poll-a-ganda in a transparent effort to make Young look bad:

"Young’s remarks have made the passage of the bill uncertain. It’s inappropriate to let it through at this moment, as a media survey had found that 65 percent of the public disapproves of Young," [said Tseng Yung-chuan, director of the KMT policy department.] *

My, my, they really ARE trying to make this thing personal.  Problem for them is, Young’s bosses have got his back:

Asked at the daily department press briefing on Friday whether Young still has US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confidence, spokesman Sean McCormack said that "he’s doing a good job" and the department has no plans to recall him from his Taipei post.

The State Department also issued a statement after the press briefing, in which a department official said Young’s comments "reflect the United States’ long time encouragement of an increase in Taiwan’s overall defense spending and for funding a strategy that reinforces stability in the Taiwan Strait."

"Director Young’s remarks are fully consistent with long-held US positions and are based on our assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs," it said.

It’s not personal, Sonny.  It’s strictly business. I wouldn’t call this merely a defense of Stephen Young; I’d call it a warning.  Should Young be expelled, Washington won’t view it as the "legitimate" comeuppance of an impolitic diplomat – an act confined in importance to a single individual.  Instead, it’ll be seen as the rejection of an official who is faithfully and accurately representing American positions – an act of open contempt for American interests.

But hey, the KMT claims Young has a 65% disapproval rating with the Taiwanese public.  So go ahead and knock yourselves out, guys.

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* The KMT has played this little game with President Chen’s approval ratings as well, announcing on previous occasions that Chen’s low numbers provided them with sufficient reason not to bring the special arms bill to a vote.

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UPDATE:  The KMT on Monday decided to tell America to shut up and sit down:

…the legislature’s [KMT-dominated] Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee passed a resolution asking the US Department of State to create measures restraining its diplomats’  remarks in Taiwan, saying that Young’s statement had violated diplomatic courtesy and could be interpreted as interference with Taiwan’s internal affairs.

(Yes I know, the KMT didn’t literally tell America to keep silent; they instead told Stephen Young to hold his tongue.  But Young only delivered a message that the American government WANTED delivered.  So in a very real way, telling Young to shut up is tantamount to telling the American government to do so as well.)

What’s remarkable here is that it was only five months ago that the KMT was high-fiving America for punishing President Chen for abolishing the National Unification Council, and one month ago that it BEGGED America to ask Chen to resign during the heat of the redshirt protests.

KMT outrage over American "interference" is nothing if not selective.

The Taipei Times elaborated on the measure:

The resolution said that it was designed to prevent US diplomats from hurting the feelings of the people of Taiwan and harming Taiwan’s democracy.

It was passed to prevent the feelings of the Taiwanese from being hurt?  Somebody ought to tell the KMT that ever since they started pal-ling around with the Communist Party of China, they’ve even begun SOUNDING alike.

UPDATE (Nov 5/06):  From Johnny Neihu’s Saturday column, a State Department official is questioned by an anti-Young Taiwanese reporter:

Question: Based on the strong reaction from Taiwan’s opposition, under such circumstances, Mr. Stephen Young is — seems to be a liability rather than an asset. So do you have any — under such [sic] current situation, do you have any plan to recall him or anything else?

Mr. McCormack: No.

Question: Does he [sic] still have confidence in him?

Mr. McCormack: He’s doing a good job.

You’ve heard of push polling, right? This is typical Taiwanese "push reporting" — or asking leading questions — in which a reporter turns a personal opinion ("seems to be") into a statement of fact ("under such current situation"). Most responses can then be twisted to make the reporter’s opinion look like fact in the write-up, though Sean McCormack in this case very professionally chose not to play the game.

If you watch the video on the State Department Web site, you can sense the contempt McCormack feels toward his interrogator. And my spy in Washington tells me there was some embarrassment among the other reporters.

He’s doing a good job.  Not quite the answer the reporter was fishing for.

UPDATE (Nov 10/06):  A Monday column in the Taipei Times had this point to make:

If one looks at the current arms deal as a simple business transaction, how is it unreasonable for a seller to offer the buyer a last chance to make the purchase after he or she has gone back on promises and dragged out the negotiations?

How could this be construed as "political interference?" Opposition politicians could always come out and say clearly that they don’t want to buy the US’ weapons and be done with it.

Barring any future statements by Mr. Young, this story has pretty much played itself out.  The KMT has turned its attention back to their attempts to recall President Chen, and campaigning against an American diplomat represents a distraction from that effort.

UPDATE (NOV 11/06):  From Thursday’s Taiwan News:

KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang, a member of the defense committee, said his party reached a consensus two months ago to back the purchase of the aircraft.  [the 12 P3C Orion anti-submarine planes offered in the special arms package].

So they reached consensus to support part of the package two months ago, but it took Stephen Young’s arm twisting to finally get them moving.  Even the KMT is now admitting that they’ve been playing political games with this for a while.

No, no – BANANAS.  They wouldn’t want anyone to think they’re STOOPID, would they?

(Photo from the Taipei Times.)

That’s a skeletal Uncle Sam clutching a PAC II (Patriot) missile.  Which is pretty scary, if you happen to be a red who doesn’t want any of Beijing’s 800 to miss their targets.

Communist capitulationists (banana farmers, my foot) marched to the de facto American embassy in Taipei on Friday, offering this bit of choice defense budget advice for their country’s leaders:

"Don’t buy weapons, buy bananas!*  [Stephen] Young, get out of Taiwan!**"

With stategic vision like that, how did the KMT EVER manage to lose a civil war?

(Hat tip to The View from Taiwan for pointing out that Peking Duck was there, and later blogged about his run-in with the mob.)

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* Taiwan is currently facing a banana glut.

**  Stephen Young is America’s top diplomat in Taiwan.

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UPDATE:  The papers all said that there were "scores" of protesters, which is pretty small considering Taiwan’s population of 23 million.  As a Where’s Waldo-esque exercise, compare Friday’s protesters to the ones in this picture:

(Photo from the March 15/06 ed of the Taiwan News.  Sorry, no link available.)

Same skull mask and gloves, same missiles, same guy in the yellow hard hat.  How much would anyone like to bet that the "banana farmer" of Friday’s protest was the "credit card slave" of seven months ago?

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The story made the front page of both the Taipei Times and the Taiwan News on Tuesday, while the China Post buried it on page 19.  The Bush Administration’s message to Taiwan:  You want to play political games with your security?  Include us out.

To be honest, I’m surprised this didn’t happen sooner.  What did Taiwan’s KMT party leaders think they could do – block the 2001 special arms bill ANOTHER 58 times over the NEXT two years, and get away with it, scot-free?  Bush took the flak from China for offering weapons that the KMT itself requested in the late ’90s, and the KMT said thank you by wittingly or unwittingly colluding with Communist China to keep the island undefended. 

So now, the KMT is receiving a little thank you in return – Texas-style.

I DO have a few minor criticisms about the way this was handled.  First, top U.S. officials should have publicly spoken about Washington’s growing impatience, which would have given the lie to the KMT’s local spin that their intransigence was actually earning America’s respect.  Second, the KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou, should have been given the cold shoulder during his visit to America back in March of this year.  That would have been a clear sign of Washington’s displeasure with the KMT’s antics.  Perhaps harsh words WERE spoken to him in private; but politically speaking, those conversations were irrelevant.  Ma was able to return to Taiwan and portray the red-carpet treatment he received as whole-hearted American support for his party’s capitulationist policies.

Finally, I think the timing of this is also a mistake.  Right now, all eyes in Taiwan are distracted by the Depose [President] Chen circus, which will soften the impact of this move.  Picture such a bombshell being dropped a month before the Taiwanese legislative elections – that would have been BEAUTIFUL.

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UPDATE (Oct 6/06):   The View from Taiwan is a bit more indignant over this than I am.  As for myself, I’ve been expecting some kind of American response to the KMT’s stonewalling for a long time now.  But I certainly agree with these sentiments:

If the US really wants Taiwan to purchase those weapons, it needs to lean on the Blues, and hard. It needs to stop coddling KMT visitors. It needs to get credible people over here who will warn the KMT that US patience is exhausted, and that the US will switch its support to the Greens if the KMT does not start serving the interests of Taiwan, and it needs to keep doing that until the message gets through. It is incredible at this late date, with the Blues blocking the arms purchase after promising it would go through, fomenting unrest in Taiwan’s streets, paralyzing the government, and cooperating with China, that any American policymaker could consider them a viable partner for future long-term cooperation.

As I said earlier, the timing for this was pretty bad.  There hasn’t been so much as a single editorial here in the English papers about the issue, because everyone’s preoccupied with anti-Chen protesters.  If you want to send a message to someone, you have to make sure they’re at home to pick up the the phone.

UPDATE (Oct 31/06):  America ratchets up the pressure, cancelling an annual meeting between the American and Taiwanese military:

[A Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense spokesman] told the Taipei Times by telephone that an annual meeting in which officials from the ministry’s Armaments Bureau travel to the US for exchanges with the US military had been suspended.

A ministry source, speaking on condition of anonymity, told the Liberty Times, (the Taipei Times‘ sister newspaper), that the ministry had tried to salvage the situation, but was told that the decision had been made by a high-ranking official in the White House.

Hope the Taiwanese people get the message soon, because the KMT obviously isn’t.

UPDATE (Nov 14/06):  Looks like there’s still some movement on the F-16 C/Ds.